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 “The wrath of the terrorist is rarely uncontrolled.  Contrary to both popular belief and media 
depiction, most terrorism is neither crazed nor capricious.  Rather, terrorist attacks are generally as 
carefully planned as they are premeditated.” 
 
     Bruce Hoffman, RAND Corporation 
 
 
“The best method to control something is to understand how it works.” 
 
     J. Doyne Farmer, Santa Fe Institute 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 As we started thinking about how to organize this paper, I was reminded of two 
statements which powerfully impressed me as a student of National Security Policy at 
Yale University nearly two decades ago.  Paul Bracken (1984), who had just recently left 
the Hudson Institute, where had worked a number of years for Hermann Kahn, the “father 
of modern nuclear strategy” impressed upon us very early on that National security 
policy, which in those days was primarily focused upon the command and control of 
nuclear forces, is characterized by irreducible levels of ambiguity and complexity.
 The mathematical revolution of chaos theory and complexity science has given us 
powerful new modeling tools that were unthinkable just a generation ago.  The pace of 
technological change has matched the emergence of new sciences in ways which 
likewise would have been difficult to conceive of in even the relatively recent past.  For 
example, one of the primary purposes of the U.S. 1979 Export Administration Act was to 
prevent the migration of dual-use technologies like the 32 bit architecture of the Intel 
80486 Microprocessor, which could be used as a targeting system for ICBM’s.  Today 
there’s more science and technology involved in controlling the scaling dynamics of 
internet traffic packet delay than there is in designing the navigational system for mid-
course correction on any ballistic missile re-entry system.ii  When these kinds of 
technological developments are combined with the new power of autonomous non-state 
actors and various persistent vulnerabilities of complex, self-organizing systems 
(“Avoiding Complexity Catastrophe”, McKelvey, 1999) the challenges of national 
security in the 21st century truly take on an entirely different character and require, 
tools, techniques, resources, models and knowledge which are fundamentally different 
from their 20th century predecessors. 
 In the context of this newly emerging dynamics, a proper approach to modeling 
terrorist networks and their flows of information, money, and material needs to be 
                                                 
ii See Qong Li and David Mills, “Investigating the Scaling Behavior, Crossover and Antipersistence 
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structured in such a way that at the mid-range, various government agencies can 
efficiently share information, spread and reduce risk, especially risk to sensitive 
infrastructure or epidemiological risk from bio-weapons. 
 
Terrorism is not Random 
 
 
J. Doyne Farmer, of the Santa Fe Institute, captures Hoffman’s non-randomness 
argument an Edge (http://www.edge.com) interview when he notes that:iii 
 
 Randomness and determinism are the poles that define the extremes in 
any assignment of causality. Of course reality is usually somewhere in 
between. Following Poincare′, we say that something is random if the 
cause seems to have little to do with the effect. Even though there is 
nothing more deterministic than celestial mechanics, if someone gets hit in 
the head by a meteor, we say this is bad luck, a random event, because 
their head and the meteor had little to do with each other. Nobody threw 
the meteor, and it could just as well have hit someone else. The 
corresponding point of view here is that bin Laden and his associates are 
an anomaly, and the fact that they are picking on us is just bad luck. We 
haven't done anything wrong and there is no reason to change our 
behavior; if we can just get rid of them, the problem will disappear. This is 
the view that we would all rather believe because the remedy is much 
easier. 
 
 Farmer goes on to explain the obvious, where he is in substantial agreement with 
Fuller and Hoffman that while we might like to believe in the “bad luck” theory, 
terrorism generally has deep, underlying causes and is not likely to go away on its own. 
In fact, much as Bruce Russet and Paul Kennedy at Yale University have shown in the 
case of war casualties, which have risen by an order of magnitude each century,iv there 
appears to be an emerging pattern where the overall number of casualties resulting from 
terrorism is also growing at exponential rate.   
 Yet, getting at the root causes of terrorism is one of those things that falls into the 
category of irreducible complexity and ambiguity.  It is, in fact, the very difficulty of the 
enterprise which leads us towards looking at solutions at the mid-range rather than 
proposing some hypothetical system or methodology which would render terrorist acts 
either highly predictable (and hence, theoretically avoidable) or which would allow the  
dismantling of terrorist organizations as soon as they form.  In terms of formal properties 
of the system, terrorist behavior falls somewhere between the purely chaotic and the 
fully deterministic realms, which we represent as a non-linear dynamical system, 
characterized by a low-order chaotic attractor.    
                                                 
iii J. Doyne Farmer, “What Now?”, http://www.edge.org/documents/whatnow/whatnow_farmer.html 
iv (a) Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, David Kinsella ,World Politics: The Menu for Choice, Wadsworth 
Publishing, 6th edition, 1999; (b) Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic 
Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Vintage Books, 1989. 
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 As a pattern of behaviors, terrorism can be modeled in the same way as other 
phenomena which exhibit regularity but not periodicity (i.e., locally random, but globally 
defined).v  Farmer, for example describes the two principal approaches to dealing with 
prediction in a “chaotic” system.  The first is a formal predictive methodology.  Relating 
terrorism to “simple” systemsvi such as roulette wheels, turbulent fluids and stock 
markets, he explains:vii 
 
 
To predict the trajectory of something, you have to understand all the 
details and keep track of every little thing. This is like solving terrorism by 
surveillance and security. Put a system in place that will detect and track 
every terrorist and prevent them from acting. This is a tempting solution, 
because it is easy to build a political consensus for it, and it involves 
technology, which is something we are good at. But if there is one thing I 
have learned in my twenty five years of trying to predict chaotic systems, 
it is this: It is really hard, and it is fundamentally impossible to do it well. 
This is particularly so when it involves a large number of independent 
actors, each of which is difficult to predict. We should think carefully 
about similar situations, such as the drug war: As long as people are 
willing to pay a lot of money for drugs, no matter how hard we try to stop 
them, drugs will be produced, and smugglers and dealers will figure out 
how to avoid interception. We have been fighting the drug war for more 
than thirty years, and have made essentially no progress. If we take the 
same approach against terrorism we are sure to fail, for the same reasons. 
 
 
 For this reason, along with the reasons cited in our references, we do acknowledge the 
impossibility of total predictivity.  However, we also still believe that over and above any 
which might be taken at the state level, the greatest room for improving the performance 
of those organizations tasked with preventing or combating terrorism is at the mid-range.  
That is, we think the application of the most recent advances in science is most likely to 
                                                 
v At a basic mathematical level, this kind of phenomenon is explained very clearly by Edgar Peters in 
“Chaos and Order in the Capital Markets”, John Wiley and  Sons, 1992.  A more rigorous treatment can be 
found in “Statistical Mechanics of Complex Networks” by Reka Albert and Laszlo Barbási, arXiv:cond-
mat/0106096v1 6Jun2001, http://www.nd.edu/~networks/Papers/review.pdf 
vi Here, Farmer is having a bit of a laugh at the expense of his audience.  By “simple” systems he means 
complex, non-linear systems whose strange attractor is one of sufficiently low dimension that there is an 
observable phenomenon of closely packed state space and mapping of the phase space with Lyapunov 
exponents is relatively tractable.  A “complex” system in this context would be one with a sparsely 
populated state space, with bifurcations taking place so frequently that even if there is a strange attractor, 
the “curse of dimensionality” makes it computationally intractable.  The definitive work on the subject is 
(a) Farmer’s paper, “Chaotic Attractors of an Infinite-Dimensional Dynamical System”, Physica D, 4 
(1982) 366-393.  A good representative demonstration of the techniques involved is (b)  Shampine and 
Thompson’s “Solving Delay Differential Equations with dde23” available on the world wide web at 
http://www.cs.runet.edu/~thompson/webddes/tutorial.html#CITEjdf .  (c) Stuart Kauffman also draws on 
Farmer’s treatment in “The Structure of Rugged Fitness Landscapes”, Chapter Two of The Origins of 
Order, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 33-67. 
vii Ibid., No. 2 
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bear fruit in the fight against terrorism not at the level of state leadership, and not at the 
level of mapping and predicting the behavior of each individual terrorist, but rather at an 
intermediate or organizational level, which, following the late Theda Skocpol, we 
characterize as “action at the mid-range”.   
 
September 11 and Network Analysis Models: Simple Distributional Properties 
 
 
 The first difficulty which the analyst must face in constructing a network analysis of 
terrorist organizations is the difficulty of building an accurate map.  Valdis Krebs, who 
has used network analysis to provide an extensive analysis of the 9/11 Hijackers network, 
explains three problems he encountered very early on.  Drawing on the work of Malcolm 
Sparrow, he notes that three problems are likely to plague the social network analyst 
regardless of context.  These are:viii  
 
1.  Incompleteness - the inevitability of missing nodes and links that the 
investigators will not uncover.  
2. Fuzzy boundaries - the difficulty in deciding who to include and who not 
to include.  
3. Dynamic - these networks are not static, they are always changing. 
 
 In addition, there is rather a bit of a paradox in that even using a more sophisticated 
methodology, such as measuring the strength of ties in terrorist networks, (i.e. vector vs. 
scalar values) may still not yield a more useful map.  One reason for this is that many of 
the factors which determine the strength of terrorist ties are prior connections, which are 
not easily measured and which, over the short run, may leave the analyst with an 
impractically sparse network.ix   
 The sparseness of terrorist networks, however, is also a bit of a two-edged sword.  In 
Krebs’ initial mapping (Figure I), he found that the 19 member network had an average 
path length of 4.75 steps, with some of the hijackers separated by more than 6 steps, and 
some of the associates over the observable event horizon.  Krebs describes this as trading 
efficiency for secrecy.   Another way of describing this process is extreme 
compartmentation or even “over-compartmentation”.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
viii Valdis Krebs, “Uncloaking Terrorist Networks”, First Monday, 
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue7_4/krebs/ 
ix Ibid. 
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Figure I:  Valdis Krebs’ Initial Mapping of the 9/11 Hijackers’ Network 
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Complex Networks: Beyond Simple Heterogeneous Preferences 
 
 
 Complex systems tools, especially network analysis, offer some very strong insights 
about the behavior of terrorist networks, but in the flood of data which has hit the market 
since 9/11 it is often difficult or impossible to tell who has chosen an appropriate 
methodology and who has not.  Equally difficult is discerning whether a complex model 
truly possesses the ability to model terrorism in newer, more accurate, more powerful 
ways.  Some models may be mathematically complex, but yield little in the way of 
practical results, simply because their method is static and terrorist cells are a dynamic 
phenomenon.x 
 The previously unstructured concept of terrorist networks takes on a new character in 
the treatment advanced by Krebs.xi Krebs’ network mapping draws on the application of 
social network analysis and develops a software system based methodology which he 
uses to map knowledge networks within and across the boundaries of an organization in 
order to uncover the dynamics of learning and adaptation.  This kind of organizational 
network analysis combines social network analysis and organizational behavior with 
chaos theory and complex adaptive systems. The network mapping goes far beyond the 
formal organizational structure by exposing the real knowledge-sharing dynamics within 
the functional structures.  Krebs describes these communities of practice as emergent 
groups in which knowledge is concentrated around common problems and interests, and 
the core competencies of an organization are shared and developed (his organizational 
                                                 
x A classic mistake in this area is frequently made when the authors apply neoclassical microeconomic  
“rational actor” assumptions to modeling terrorism which creates a static, homogenous treatment of 
opponents and sows more confusion than it resolves.  While the rational actor methodology was once 
extremely popular in economics, it has been generally dismissed by “hard” science, and is slowly being 
replaced by complexity science’s  heterogeneous agent based modeling.  Typically, an agent based model 
presumes heterogeneous agent composition, preferences and behaviors and uses the stochastic microagent 
assumption  to replace the rational actor model.  For an explanation of agent-based modeling, see J. Doyne 
Farmer, “Toward Agent Based Models for Investment”, http://www.santafe.edu/~jdf/aimr.pdf , and 
“Physicists Attempt to Scale the Ivory Towers of Finance”, Computing in Science and Engineering, 
December, 1999, http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/99-10-073.pdf 
For applications of agent based models to terrorism, see Michael Johns and Barry Silverman, “How 
Emotions and Personality Affect the Utility of Alternative Decisions: A Terrorist Target Selection Case 
Study” http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~barryg/emotion.pdf , or Ronald A. Woodman, “Agent Based 
Simulation of Military Operations Other Than War: Small Unit Combat, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, September, 2000 
http://diana.gl.nps.navy.mil/~ahbuss/StudentTheses/WoodamanThesis.pdf 
xi Valdis Krebs, (a)  “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells”, Connections 24(3): 43-52 
http://www.orgnet.com/MappingTerroristNetworks.pdf  (b) “Surveillance of Terrorist Networks”, 
http://www.orgnet.com/tnet.html (c) Social Network Analysis of the 9-11 Terrorist Network, 
http://www.orgnet.com/hijackers.html 
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mapping of terrorist networks derives in large part from his earlier work mapping 
corporations and studying the dynamics of organizational learning.) 
 The measurement of these “complex human structures” focuses on individual 
network centrality, which reveals key individuals in the information flow and 
knowledge exchange. High centrality scores demonstrate extensive access to “hidden 
assets” within the organization of an entity with high capacity to “get things done”.  
Network centrality relates the performance of the network as shown below. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Krebs’ extended model 9-11 hijacker model with measures of centrality 
 What is interesting about this second plot is that it illuminates the ways in which 
terrorist compartmentation dictates the operational parameters of a terrorist attack.  Such 
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mappings may also yield previously hidden information about the command structure of 
terrorist organizations.  In “Six Degrees of Mohammed Atta”, Thomas Stewart describes 
several important features of Krebs’ network, and points out that:xii 
 
 
 It is not a complete picture; among other problems, it shows only those 
links that have been publicly disclosed. Still, it's possible to make some 
interesting inferences. First, the greatest number of lines led to Atta, who 
scores highest on all three measures, with Al-Shehhi, who is second in 
both activity and closeness, close behind. However, Nawaf Alhazmi, one 
of the American Flight 77 hijackers, is an interesting figure. In Krebs's 
number crunching, Alhazmi comes in second in betweenness, suggesting 
that he exercised a lot of control, but fourth in activity and only seventh in 
closeness. But if you eliminate the thinnest links (which also tend to be the 
most recent -- phone calls and other connections made just before Sept. 
11), Alhazmi becomes the most powerful node in the net. He is first in 
both control and access, and second only to Atta in activity. It would be 
worth exploring the hypothesis that Alhazmi played a large role in 
planning the attacks, and Atta came to the fore when it was time to carry 
them out. 
 
 
 To return to measures of centrality, and the dynamic operational advantage which 
high centrality incurs, one must first understand how such a system can take advantage of 
wide degrees of separation between cells.  Operational benefits arise from the pattern of 
connections surrounding a node that allows for wide network reach with minimal direct 
ties. “Structural holes” at the intersection of flows across knowledge communities 
position unique and superior nodes. It is the individuals spanning these “internal holes of 
opportunity” that impact the network’s functioning and performance.  The implicit 
corollary of this is that if a small number of these critical nodes can be identified and 
“clipped” from the network, then command signals will not be able to propagate through 
the system. 
 In Krebs’ mapping, the main centrality measures are degrees (number of direct 
connections that a node has), betweenness (the ability of an individual to link to 
important constituencies) and closeness (a position’s ability to monitor the information 
flow and to “see” what is happening in the network). The knowledge flow is facilitated 
and influenced by boundary spanners with access to information flowing in other 
clusters, as well as peripheral players that bring fresh information into the network. A 
network with a low centralization score is more resilient in that it has no single highly-
central points of failure. These networks “fail gracefully” as the damage of a node does 
not lead to a breakdown in information flows and coordination links.  
  
 
 
                                                 
xii Thomas A. Stewart, “Six Degrees of Mohammed Atta”, Business 2.0, December, 2001, 
http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/0,1640,35253,FF.html 
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Social Network Theory 
 
 
 What social network analysis contributes to counter-terrorism is the ability to map 
the invisible dynamics inside a terrorist community. The methodology draws upon 
graphical representation in exploring and presenting the patterns displayed by structural 
data.  In the case of terrorist networks, surveillance of the daily activities and contacts of 
suspects reveals the network around them and thus adds more nodes and links of 
intentional contacts to the map. Once the direct links are identified, and the “connections 
of the connections” are included, the key individuals begin to stand out. In 2000, the 
Central Intelligence Agency identified al-Qaeda suspects Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid 
Almihdhar attending a meeting in Malaysia. The mapping of the links between the 
terrorists involved in the WTC attacks shows that all 19 hijackers were within two 
degrees from these original suspects, while they also had multiple ties back into the 
network.   
 Based on publicly released information from the investigation of the 9/11 terrorists 
Krebs mapped and evaluated the links which tied the network together and analyzed its 
resilience. Each link’s strength was evaluated based upon the amount of time members 
spent together.  Interactions were rank ordered so that those living together or attending 
the same training were assigned the strongest ties, the terrorists traveling or participating 
in common meetings were given ties of moderate strength, and finally, those ties which 
reflected only occasional relations were characterized as weak links.  The thickness of the 
lines in Figure 2 corresponds to the strength of the ties between the terrorists. This 
mapping exhibits a dispersed but well-defined structure, although as mentioned earlier, 
the connections between members are more than usually distant.  
 As the positioning of Alhazmi discussed above suggests, strong ties may have been 
inactive and hidden for relatively long intervals, whereas a minimum of weak ties 
ensured secrecy.  This configuration reveals a network which was consciously 
constructed on the principle of minimizing damage to the organization as a whole in the 
event that a link is compromised.  
 This type of network can only achieve its goals by the use of transitory shortcuts that 
temporarily balance the need for covertness with the need for intense information flow 
and coordination in active times.xiii  Sources of public information show that the dense 
and resilient ties forged in the past were “invisible” during the hijackers’ stay in the US. 
This “massive redundancy through trusted prior contacts” is considered one the major 
hidden strengths of this network.  Such a finding once again highlights the need for 
human collection, particularly in remote locations.  All the tasking in the world by   
Homeland Security or any other security service won’t matter a whit if the ability to 
identify strong connective linkages between terrorists. 
 After the 9/11 disaster, there was a trend in Washington to talk about the hijackings as 
a massive intelligence failure.  If we take network analysis seriously, then the failure 
leading to 9/11 was the result of not having built up human intelligence resources capable 
                                                 
xiii Duncan J. Watts, 1999. "Networks, Dynamics, and the Small-World Phenomenon," American Journal 
of Sociology, volume 13, number 2, pp. 493-527. 
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of recognizing and responding to the evolution of Al-Qaeda and its field operatives.xiv  
Michael Porter has been arguing for over two decades in competitive strategy that when 
firms compete with their buyers and suppliers, the more concentrated group wins, 
claiming the bulk of the profits for themselves.xv  If I were the head of any nation’s 
intelligence service, I would be asking myself very seriously why terrorist organizations 
are able to achieve a higher level of coordination and robustness than my own counter-
terrorist division? 
 As compared to static models, Krebs’ work analyzes the dynamics of the network and 
also recognizes the centrality measure’s sensitivity to changes in nodes and links. In 
terms of utility as a counter-intelligence tool, the mapping exposes a concentration of 
links around the pilots, an organizational weakness which could have been used against 
the hijackers had the mapping been available prior to, rather than after the disaster.xvi 
 Because nodes with high centrality are potential points of failure they need to be 
mapped and monitored and whenever possible, removed.  If enough nodes with high 
centrality are removed at the same time, this will cause the network to fragment into 
unconnected sub-networks.  Naturally, the more compartmented the organization is, the 
fewer nodes of centrality need be removed in order to cause the network to implode.  
One trigger for moving from monitoring to disabling is a sudden increase in the flow of 
either money or information flow between links, and rapidly forming connections. In this 
regard, SIGINT can prove a powerful supplement to HUMINT.  If an initial map of 
members and connections can be assembled, then SIGINT can indicate critical time 
periods.  If we take Krebs’ comment about the 9/11 network possessing self-organizing 
system properties, then the optimal time to intervene and remove high-centrality nodes 
is just at the beginning of the organizational equivalent of a “phase transition”.xvii 
 
 
Social Cohesion and Adhesion: Further Measures of Organizational Structure 
 
 
 Moody and White provide an expansion of the social solidarity concept and the 
understanding of linkages between members of a community, the changing 
interconnections and the impact on node connectivity in “Social Cohesion and 
Embeddedness”.xviii  They argue that the defining characteristic of a strongly cohesive 
group is that “it has a status beyond any individual group member”.  The authors define 
structural cohesion as “the minimum number of actors who, if removed from a group, 
                                                 
xiv See Reuel Marc Gerecht, “The Counterterrorist Myth”, The Atlantic Monthly, July-August, 2001. 
xv See Michael Porter, (a)  “How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy”, Harvard Business Review, July-
August, 1979, (b) “What is Strategy”, Harvard Business Review, November-December, 1996. 
xvi See Peter Klerks, “The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organisations: Theoretical Nitpicking or 
a relevant doctrine for investigators? Recent developments for the Netherlands,” Connections, 24(3): 53-65 
http://www.sfu.ca/~insna/Connections-Web/Volume24-3/klerks.pdf 
xvii For more detail on this subject see Michael Lissack, “Chaos and Complexity -- What does that have to 
do with knowledge management?” Knowledge Management: Organization, Competence and Methodology, 
ed. J. F. Schreinemakers. Wurzburg, Germany, Ergon Verlog. 1: 62-81. 
http://www.lissack.com/writings/knowledge.htm 
xviii James Moody, Douglas R. White, “Social Cohesion and Embeddedness: A Hierarchical Conception of 
Social Groups, Santa Fe Institute Working Papers, 00-08-049, 
http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/00-08-049.pdf 
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would disconnect the group”, leading to hierarchically nested groups, where highly 
cohesive groups are embedded within less cohesive groups. Thus, cohesions is an 
emergent property of the relational pattern that holds a group together.  
 As the dynamical process of group development unfolds, typically a weak form of 
structural cohesion begins to emerge as collections of unrelated individuals begin 
connecting through a single path which reflects new relationships. As additional relations 
form among previously connected pairs of individuals, multiple paths through the group 
develop, increasing the community’s ability to “hold together”.  
 In situations where relations revolve around a leader, the group is often described as 
“notoriously fragile”, illustrating the fact that increasing relational volume thru a single 
individual does not necessarily promote cohesiveness . Nevertheless, groups with an all-
in-one relational organization such as terrorist networks, may be stable and robust to 
disruptions if “extraordinary efforts” are put into maintaining their weak relational 
structure. The spoke-and-hub configuration of these networks thrives on the lack of 
knowledge that each particular node has about the organization as a whole, a captured or 
destroyed link in the network does not put the organization at risk. The stability of such 
groups depends on the ability to keep the hub hidden, because the hub then becomes the 
entire group’s  fundamental structural weakness.  
 Weakly cohesive organizations also promote segmentation into structures that are 
only minimally connected to the rest of the group, leading to schisms and factions. These 
organizations are also easily disrupted by individuals leaving the group. Usually, 
individuals whose removal would disconnect the group are those in control of the flow 
of resources in the network.  
 On the contrary, collectivities that do not depend on individual actors are less easily 
segmented. These highly cohesive groups benefit form the existence of multiple paths 
and sets of alternative linkages, with no individual or minority within the group 
exercising control over resources. The “multiple connectivity” is thus the essential feature 
of the strong structurally cohesive organizations.   
 An interesting characteristic of such highly cohesive networks (HCN’s) is that they 
are characterized by a reduction in the power provided by structural holes, such that the 
ability of any individual to have power within the setting is limited as connectivity 
increases.xix For a structurally cohesive group, the information transmission increases 
with each additional independent path in the network, which may infer that high 
connectivity leads to more reliability as information is combined from independent 
multiple sources. “local pockets of high connectivity” can act as “amplifying substations” 
of information and/or resources. Moody and White relate this operationalization to the 
actors’ relative involvement depth in social relations, as defined by the concept of 
embeddedness:xx  
 
 
“If cohesive groups are nested within each other, then each successive 
group is more deeply embedded within the network. As such, one aspect 
                                                 
xix In terms of strategy, destabilizing this kind of network means pressuring the group to increase its 
recruitment and raise its connectivity as opposed to the strategy of forced over-compartmentation.  Induced 
excess connectivity represents a different kind of complexity overload. 
xx Ibid. No. 17 
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of embeddedness- the depth of involvement in a relational structure- is 
captured by the extent to which a group is nested within the relational 
structure.” 
 
 In a companion paper to Moody and White’s “Social Cohesion and Embeddedness”, 
White and Harary, in distinguishing between the adhesion concept related to the 
attractive or charismatic qualities of leaders (or attractions to their followers) that create 
weaker or stronger many-to-one ties or commitments, and the cohesion defined by the 
many-to-many ties among individuals, as they form into clusters.xxi  
 The authors reiterate the intuitive aspects of the cohesion’s definition: a group is 
cohesive to the extent that the social relations of its members are resistant to the group 
being pulled apart, and a group is cohesive to the extent that the multiple social relations 
of its members pull it together. In revisiting the idea that minimal cohesion occurs in 
social networks with a strong group leader or popular figure, White and Harary 
introduce the concept of “adherents” of a social group to specify “the many-to-one 
commitments of individuals to the group itself or to its leadership”.  
 
 
“What holds the group together where this is the major factor in group 
solidarity is the strength of adhesion of members to the leader, not the 
cohesiveness of group members in terms of social ties amongst 
themselves. The model of “adhesion” rather than cohesion might apply to 
the case of a purely vertical bureaucracy where there are no lateral ties. “ 
 
 
 As a general definition, a group is adhesive to the extent that the social relations of 
its members are pairwise-resistant to being pulled apart.xxii Another element of group 
robustness is the redundancy of connections:xxiii 
 
 The level of cohesion is higher when members of a group are 
connected as opposed to disconnected, and further, when the group and its 
actors are not only connected but also have redundancies in their 
interconnections. The higher the redundancies of independent connections 
between pairs of nodes, the higher the cohesion, and the more social 
circles in which any pair of persons is contained. 
                                                 
xxi The Cohesiveness of Blocks in Social Networks: 
Node Connectivity and Conditional Density. Submitted to Sociological Methodology 2001. 
http://www.santafe.edu/files/workshops/dynamics/sm-wh8a.pdf 
xxii The concept of cohesion is formalized through the use of graph theory.  The graph is defined so that the  
vertices represent the set of individuals in the network, and the edges are the relations among actors defined 
as paired sets. The subsets of nodes that link non-adjacent vertices will disconnect actors if removed. Any 
such set of nodes is called an (i, j) cut-set if every path connecting i and j passes through at least one node 
of the set . The “cut-set resistance to being pulled apart” criterion and the multiple independent paths “held 
together” criterion of cohesion are formally equivalent in this formal specification.  This kind of graph, if 
constructed with complete information, also provides a predictive mechanism for exactly which nodes need 
to be removed in order to remove the possibility of signals propagating through the system. 
xxiii Ibid  
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 The important consideration for counter-intelligence here is that the higher the level 
of redundancy, the more likely the existence of the group is to be revealed and the 
easier it is to create a map of social network relationships.  A major part of the 
successful exploitation of this group characteristic is another basic counter-intelligence 
principle—coverage.  Good coverage will yield good observations from which good 
social network maps can be derived.  The caution here, as we have already noted, is like 
many other HUMINT activities, good coverage is not possible to achieve solely by 
satellite reconnaissance or any other national technical means (NTM).  Of course, once 
target individuals have been identified, dedicated remote sensing technology can, in fact, 
be a very helpful adjunct to the processes of coverage, compartmentation and penetration. 
 Another logical inference is that measurable differences in cohesiveness should 
have predictive consequences for social groups and their members across many different 
social contexts.  In terms of counter-terrorism, this is a clear, predictive model which can 
be utilized for the optimization of effort and resources.  It’s not merely a case of getting 
the most “bang for the buck”, but it is an ideal mid-range solution for empirically 
validated scientific research to provide a typology which allows groups to be 
characterized in such a way that when resources are directed at preventing the group from 
executing terrorist attacks, the resources are used in an operationally efficient fashion.  
To bring it down to the micro level, it won’t do any good to remove the leader of a 
group which is characterized by a strong measure of adhesion.  Just as it would do no 
good to attempt to counter a group with strong cohesion by removing its charismatic 
leader.  If no other lesson for counter terrorism comes out of this discussion, 
understanding this one critical rule is enough to save millions of dollars and thousands 
of lives. 
   
